Bank Capitalization as a Signal (PDF Download)

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Author/Editor: Daniel C. Hardy
Release Date: © May, 2012
ISBN : 978-1-47558-642-8
Stock #: WPIET2012114

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Description

The level of a bank‘s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks‘ creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.




More publications in this series: Working Papers


More publications by: Daniel C. Hardy