Bank Capitalization as a Signal
Author/Editor: Daniel C. Hardy
Release Date: © May, 2012
ISBN
: 978-1-47550-335-7
Stock #: WPIEA2012114
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| Yes |
Description
The level of a bank‘s capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks‘ creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Daniel C. Hardy
