Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium
Author/Editor: Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Francisco Roch
Release Date: © January, 2012
ISBN
: 978-1-46393-315-9
Stock #: WPIEA2012030
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| Yes |
Description
This paper finds optimal fiscal rule parameter values and measures the effects of imposing fiscal rules using a default model calibrated to an economy that in the absence of a fiscal rule pays a significant sovereign default premium. The paper also studies the case in which the government conducts a voluntary debt restructuring to capture the capital gains from the increase in its debt market value implied by a rule announcement. In addition, the paper shows how debt ceilings may reduce the procyclicality of fiscal policy and thus consumption volatility.
Taxonomy
Economic policy , Fiscal policy
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Juan Carlos Hatchondo ; Leonardo Martinez ; Francisco Roch
