Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries : Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy
Author/Editor: Giorgio Brosio, Ehtisham Ahmad
Release Date: © March, 2008
ISBN
: 978-1-45186-933-0
Stock #: WPIEA2008071
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes |
Description
A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.
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