Politically Optimal Fiscal Policy
Author/Editor: Irina Yakadina, Michael Kumhof
Release Date: © March, 2007
ISBN
: 978-1-45186-632-2
Stock #: WPIEA2007068
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes | ||||||
| ePub | Yes | ||||||
| Mobipocket | Yes |
Description
Why do governments issue large amounts of debt? In what sense and for whom is such a policy optimal? We show that twisting the optimal taxation paradigm produces very reasonable predictions for debt and real interest rates. Adding an extra dimension of uncertainty about the political planning horizon gives rise to a positive and very plausible government debt-to-GDP ratio of about 55 percent in a model that otherwise predicts negative government debt. We quantify the impact of political uncertainty on steady state and business cycle dynamics. We illustrate how populist tax cuts can cause business cycle fluctuations.
Taxonomy
Business cycles , Economic development , Economic policy , Fiscal policy , Political economy
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Irina Yakadina ; Michael Kumhof
