How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence

WPIEA2005054 Image
Price:  $15.00

Author/Editor: Alexander Plekhanov, Raju Jan Singh
Release Date: © March, 2005
ISBN : 978-1-45186-073-3
Stock #: WPIEA2005054
English
Stock Status: On back-order

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Description

Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.

Taxonomy

Debt , Economic policy , Fiscal policy




More publications in this series: Working Papers


More publications by: Alexander Plekhanov ; Raju Jan Singh