The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries
Author/Editor: Stephan Danninger, Annette Kyobe, M Cangiano
Release Date: © January, 2005
ISBN
: 978-1-45186-021-4
Stock #: WPIEA2005002
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes |
Description
This paper analyzes interference and timeliness in the revenue-forecasting process, using new data on revenue-forecasting practices in low-income countries. Interference is defined as the occurrence of a significant deviation from purely technical forecasts. A theoretical model explains forecasting interference through government corruption. The data broadly supports the model, and the results are robust to alternative explanations. The paper also constructs three indices-transparency, formality, and organizational simplicity-that characterize revenue-forecasting practices, and assesses their effectiveness in producing an upfront-that is, timely-budget envelope. More transparent and simple forecasting processes lead to early budget constraints, while formality has no measurable effect.
Taxonomy
Corruption , Economic development , Economic policy , Political economy
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Stephan Danninger ; Annette Kyobe ; M Cangiano
