Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending
Author/Editor: Curzio Giannini, Carlo Cottarelli
Release Date: © November, 2002
ISBN
: 978-1-45185-982-9
Stock #: WPIEA1932002
English
Stock Status: On back-order
Languages and formats available
| English | French | Spanish | Arabic | Russian | Chinese | Portuguese | |
| Paperback | Yes |
Description
During the 1990s, the concept of "catalytic official finance" (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its "seal of approval"-backed up by only limited official financing-on the country's economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors; on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises.
Taxonomy
Capital markets , Financial crisis , Financial institutions and markets , International financial system
More publications in this series: Working Papers
More publications by: Curzio Giannini ; Carlo Cottarelli
