 | Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union Author/Editor: Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez. Release Date:September, 2016 We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all
decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary
to more...
| Price: $18.00
|
| Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking Author/Editor: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez, Luc Laeven. Release Date:December, 2010 We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an more...
| Price: $18.00
|
| Competition Among Regulators Release Date:May, 2001 This paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and more...
| Price: $20.00
|
| Flight to Quality or to Captivity : Information and Credit Allocation Author/Editor: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez. Release Date:February, 2001 Superior information exchanged over the course of lending relationships generates bank-client specificities to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. more...
| Price: $15.00
|
|
Help