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Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt

Author/Editor: Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines.

Release Date:July, 2008

We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show more...



Price: $18.00
Debt Stabilization Bias and the Taylor Principle : Optimal Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Government Debt and Inflation Persistence

Author/Editor: David Vines, Sven Jari Stehn.

Release Date:August, 2007

We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject more...



Price: $18.00